ABSTRACT In cloud storage systems, users can upload their data along with associated tags (authentication information) to cloud storage servers. To ensure the availability and integrity of the outsourced data, provable data possession (PDP) schemes convince verifiers (users or third parties) that the outsourced data stored in the cloud storage server is correct and unchanged. Recently, several PDP schemes with designated verifier (DV-PDP) were proposed to provide the flexibility of arbitrary designated verifier. A designated verifier (private verifier) is trustable and designated by a user to check the integrity of the outsourced data. However, these DV-PDP schemes are either inefficient or insecure under some circumstances. In this paper, we propose the first non-repudiable PDP scheme with designated verifier (DV-NRPDP) to address the non-repudiation issue and resolve possible disputations between users and cloud storage servers. We define the system model, framework and adversary model of DV-NRPDP schemes. Afterward, a concrete DV-NRPDP scheme is presented. Based on the computing discrete logarithm assumption, we formally prove that the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme is secure against several forgery attacks in the random oracle model. Comparisons with the previously proposed schemes are given to demonstrate the advantages of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of the Internet and wireless communication, cloud storage systems (e.g. GoogleDrive [1] and Dropbox [2] ) become more and more popular in our daily life. Cloud storage systems enable users to store their data in the remote cloud storage servers and to have access to it through the Internet. Thus, users can manage their data without requiring expensive hardware and software, while enjoying the on-demand data access services with location independence than traditional approaches [3] .
When users outsource their data to the cloud storage server, they also lose physical control on their outsourced data. So, it could incur security problems. One major concern is how to ensure the availability and integrity of the outsourced data stored in the cloud storage server [4] , [5] . In cloud storage systems, the outsourced data could be corrupted because of internal or external reasons. Even in normal circumstances, the outsourced data may be damaged or lost by administration errors. For example, the cloud storage server could lose the user's data due to hardware failure, external intrusion and human mistakes. However, the cloud storage server might attempt to hide such administration errors because the cloud storage servers hope to keep the high reputation of the system for users. If the system lose the reputation due to administration errors, users cloud not use it in the future. To address this security problem, a security mechanism should be provided for users to challenge their cloud storage server for the integrity proof that it indeed possesses the users' data. If the security problem is not properly addressed, it may retard the success of cloud storage systems.
A. RELATED WORK
To solve the security problem of the data integrity mentioned above, there are two data auditing techniques, namely, provable data possession (PDP) [6] , [7] and proof of retrievability (PoR) [8] - [10] . Both data auditing techniques allow users to check whether the cloud storage servers possess their data correctly. Concretely, by keeping some local meta data and generating some challenge messages, users can verify the proofs returned from the cloud storage servers to determine whether their data are intact. Generally, PDP schemes preserve the integrity of outsourced data, while PoR schemes provide both the integrity of outsourced data and the data recovery by using error-correcting codes, such as sentinel blocks which are check blocks and randomly embedded in the outsourced data. In 2007, Juels and Kaliski [8] proposed the notion of PoR. In this PoR scheme, the data integrity is achieved by verifying the inserted sentinel blocks, but it does not provide data update functionality. Subsequently, Shacham and Waters [9] presented two improved versions of PoR scheme, called compact PoR schemes. The first one is publicly verifiable while the second one provides private verification. Private verification means that only the data owner may perform the data integrity of the outsourced data. But the PoR schemes in [8] and [9] cannot efficiently support dynamic data updates. Afterwards, Wang et al. [10] proposed a dynamic version of PoR scheme.
In 2007, Ateniese et al. [6] proposed the first system model of provable data possession (PDP) scheme to solve the data integrity problem. Based on the large integer factoring assumption, they also presented two practical PDP schemes to achieve the integrity checking without downloading the data. In their schemes, data is divided into many small blocks and the data owner signs each block independently to generate the associated tag. The data integrity is achieved by sampling and verifying the correspondence of the tags and blocks randomly. However, the PDP scheme in [6] is only suitable for static data. Afterward, Ateniese et al. [7] also proposed a dynamic PDP scheme extended from the previous work [6] . However, the dynamic PDP scheme cannot support all kinds of data update operations. Subsequently, several PDP schemes [11] - [18] have been presented to concern with the full-dynamic case, privacy-preserving issue, batch verification, performance and different kinds of applications. In these schemes mentioned above, a public verifier can check data integrity without retrieving the entire data from the cloud storage servers, which is referred to as ''public'' PDP schemes. In public PDP schemes, anyone can verify a proof generated by the cloud storage servers. Generally, public PDP schemes require more computational cost to generate/verify a proof.
As opposite to public PDP schemes, in 2011, Shen and Tzeng [19] presented a delegable provable data possession scheme, called DPDP scheme, in which a user (data owner) generates the delegation key for a delegated verifier and stores the delegation key in the cloud storage server for verification. In 2012, Wang [20] presented a proxy PDP (PPDP) model and presented a concrete construction. In the PPDP scheme, a user can delegate the auditing capability to a proxy by sending a warrant to the proxy. The warrant will be stored both in the proxy and cloud storage servers. Indeed, both DPDP [19] and PPDP schemes [20] may be viewed as the PDP schemes with designated verifier, termed DV-PDP schemes. In the DV-PDP schemes, a user can assign some verifier (proxy) to perform the data integrity of the outsourced data on behalf of the user. However, Ren et al. [21] demonstrated that both DV-PDP schemes [19] , [20] are insecure because a malicious cloud storage server knows the key (state) information of the delegated (private) verifier. In 2015, Ren et al. [22] proposed a mutual verifiable DV-PDP scheme. In their scheme, the delegated verifier is stateless and independent from cloud storage servers, which solves the problem occurred by a malicious cloud storage server. Unfortunately, Zhang et al. [23] demonstrated that Ren et al.'s scheme suffers from forgery attacks.
It is worth mentioning, that the system models of all PDP schemes mentioned above did not generate the nonrepudiation proofs for the outsourced data. Indeed, it could incur the disputation between clients (users) and cloud storage server (CSS). For example, the CSS may repudiate that a user has ever uploaded the data to the cloud storage. On the contrast, a user did not upload some data to the CSS, but she/he claimed that the data has been uploaded or corrupted. In order to solve the disputation problem, Mo et al. [24] proposed a non-repudiable PDP scheme (NRPDP) to allow the CSS and users to supervise each other. Mo et al. ' s NRPDP scheme offers public verification so it is called a public NRPDP. In 2016, Wang et al. [25] presented a NRPDP scheme with private verification. In Wang et al.'s scheme, only the data owner may perform the data integrity of the outsourced data while providing mutual proof to protect both the data owner and the CSS.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
Indeed, we all know that DV-PDP schemes could incur the disputation between users and the CSS because they do not provide non-repudiation proofs. Up to date, there exists no NRPDP scheme with designated verifier (DV-NRPDP). It is very necessary to propose a secure DV-NRPDP scheme to provide both the functionality of designated verifier and the non-repudiation receipt of the outsourced data. Hence, in this article, we propose the first DV-NRPDP scheme to address both issues simultaneously.
We first define the system model, framework and adversary model of DV-NRPDP schemes. A concrete DV-NRPDP scheme will be proposed here. In the DV-NRPDP scheme, for each block, a user generates a tag and uploads the whole data and the associated tags to the CSS. In the meantime, the CSS generates a signature as the non-repudiation receipt of the outsourced data from the user. After that, a verifier (a user or the designated verifier) may send a challenge message to the CSS while the CSS sends the corresponding proof to convince the verifier of the integrity correctness of the user's outsourced data. In the adversary model, we define three kinds of existential unforgeabilities, namely, tag-unforgeability, receipt-unforgeability and proof-unforgeability. Based on the computing discrete logarithm (DL) assumption, we formally prove that the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme possesses the three kinds of existential unforgeabilities in the random oracle model. Finally, the comparisons with the previously proposed schemes are made to demonstrate the advantages of our DV-NRPDP scheme.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We define the system model, framework and adversary model of DV-NRPDP schemes in Section 2. In Section 3, we present the first DV-NRPDP scheme. Security analysis of the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme is given in Section 4. In Section 5, performance comparisons are given to demonstrate the advantages of our scheme. Conclusions are given in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here, we first present the system model and framework of non-repudiable PDP schemes with designated verifier (DV-NRPDP). Additionally, the adversary model of DV-NRPDP schemes is also defined to model possible attacks.
A. SYSTEM MODEL AND FRAMEWORK OF DV-NRPDP SCHEMES
Indeed, the system model of DV-PDP schemes does not provide the non-repudiation functionality for the uploaded data. Indeed, if no receipt of the uploaded data is sent to the data owner (user), the user did not hold any evidence of storing the data in the CSS. When the CSS lost the data by some accident reasons so that the CSS cannot generate a proof for checking the user's data integrity when receiving a challenge from the PV. In such a case, the CSS may repudiate that the user has ever uploaded the data to the cloud storage. On the contrast, a user did not upload some data to the CSS, but the user claimed that the data has been uploaded. Indeed, the CSS is innocent. Therefore, non-repudiation receipt will be added in the system model to resolve the disputation between users and the CSS.
Here, we define the system model of DV-NRPDP schemes depicted in Fig. 1 . The system model consists of three different roles, namely, client (user), cloud storage server (CSS) and private verifier (PV) as follows.
• Client (user): A user has massive data and would like to store them to the cloud storage server (CSS) for maintenance and computation. The user can check the integrity, correctness and availability of her/his data when she/he uses (modify, insert, or delete and so on) it. And the user can also designate a trustworthy PV to verify the integrity of data stored in the CSS.
• Cloud storage server (CSS): The CSS has significant storage space to provide the data access to users as well as powerful storage and computational resources. In addition, the CSS is also responsible to generate a proof for checking the user's data integrity when receiving a challenge from the PV. • Private verifier (PV): A PV is a semi-trusted third party with powerful computation and communication ability. The PV is trustable and designated by a user to check the integrity of data stored in the CSS on behalf of the user upon request. In the meantime, the PV should return the integrity auditing result to the user. Here, we present the operation scenario of DV-NRPDP schemes. A client (user) first designates a trustworthy PV, and divides her/his own data to blocks. Then, the client generates a tag for each block and uploads the whole data and the associated tags to the CSS. By the data D and the client's identity, the CSS sets the data extract information D EI . Afterward, the CSS generate a signature as the receipt for receiving the uploaded data from the client. In addition, the CSS sends the receipt to the client. If the receipt is valid, the client then sets the designating message D v and sends it to the PV while deleting the data D and the associated tag set from the local storage. The upload step is finished. After that, a verifier (a client or the PV) may send a challenge message Chal to the CSS. By the challenge message Chal, the CSS finds the associated data from the cloud storage, and generates the corresponding proof message P D . Finally, the CSS sends the proof message P D to the verifier (a client or the PV). The corresponding proof convinces the verifier of the integrity correctness of the client's data.
In the following, we formally define the framework of DV-NRPDP schemes.
Definition 1: A DV-NRPDP scheme consists of eight algorithms:
• Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter l as input, and returns the public parameters Parms. We assume that Parms are publicly and authentically available in all the following algorithms. Usually, this algorithm is performed by a system operator.
• KeyGen: This algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm run by a user, the PV and the CSS. The algorithm randomly VOLUME 5, 2017
selects a private key k and computes the corresponding public key K . The algorithm returns the private/public key pair (k, K ).
• TagGen: This algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm run by a user. Without loss of generality, assume that a user would like to store the data D to the cloud storage managed by the CSS while designating a private verifier (PV). The user divides the data D into n blocks, denoted by m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n . For each block m i , the user generates a tag t i and obtains the set = {t i }, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, where denotes the tag set of the data D. The user sends T D = {D, } to the CSS.
• RecGen: This algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm run by the CSS. Upon receiving T D = {D, } from a user, the CSS generates and returns a receipt R D on T D = {D, } to the user.
• VerifyRec: This algorithm is a deterministic algorithm run by a user. Upon receiving the receipt R D from the CSS, the user validates the correctness of R D for T D = {D, }. If it is valid, the user stores R D in the local storage. In the meantime, the user computes and sends the designating message D v to the PV while deleting the data D and the associated tag set from the local storage.
• ChalGen: This algorithm is a deterministic algorithm run by a verifier (a user or the PV). The verifier sets a challenge message Chal, and sends it to the CSS.
• ProofGen: This algorithm is a deterministic algorithm run by the CSS. When the CSS gets the challenge message Chal from the verifier, the CSS employs Chal to search the corresponding T D = {D, } from the cloud storage. The CSS computes and sends the proof message P D to the verifier.
• VerifyProof: This algorithm is a deterministic algorithm run by a verifier (a user or the PV). Upon receiving P D from the CSS, the verifier validates the proof message P D . The algorithm returns ''true'' if P D is valid, else returns ''false''. Note that the checking result is also sent the user if the verifier is the PV.
B. NOTATIONS
Throughout this paper, we list several notations and parameters as follows: -p: a large prime.
-Z p : a set of positive integers, each element in Z p is no larger than p. 
C. ADVERSARY MODEL
In the following, according to the system model of DV-NRPDP schemes, we present the adversary model of DV-NRPDP schemes. We say that the DV-NRPDP scheme is secure if it satisfies three kinds of existential unforgeabilities, namely, tag-unforgeability, receipt-unforgeability, and proofunforgeability defined the following Definitions 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
Definition 2 (Tag-Unforgeability): A DV-NRPDP scheme offers tag-unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks if no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game played between the adversary A and a challenger C.
• Initialization. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the public parameters Parms. Without loss of generality, we assume that a user and the PV, respectively, perform the KeyGen algorithm to set their private/public key pairs (x, X ) and (y, Y ). The challenger C possesses the public parameters Parms and public keys (X , Y ). Afterward, C then sends (X , Y , Parms) to A.
• Queries. The adversary A may adaptively issues the following query with limited times: -TagGen query. The adversary A chooses a data block m i and sends it to the challenger C. The challenger C runs the TagGen algorithm to generate a valid tag t i . In addition, C returns the tag t i to the adversary A.
• Forgery. The adversary A output a tag tuple (m * , t * ) with public keys (X , Y ). Note that m * did not appear in the TagGen query mentioned above. If the tag tuple (m * , t * ) is valid, then the adversary A wins the game. Definition 3 (Receipt-Unforgeability): A DV-NRPDP scheme offers receipt-unforgeability against adaptive chosenmessage attacks if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game played between the adversary A and a challenger C.
• Initialization. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the public parameters Parms. Without loss of generality, we assume that the CSS performs the KeyGen algorithm to set her/his private/public key pair (z, Z ). The challenger C possesses the public parameters Parms and the public key Z . Afterward, C then sends (Z , Parms) to A.
• Queries. 
Definition 4 (Proof-Unforgeability):
A DV-NRPDP scheme offers proof-unforgeability against adaptive chosenmessage attacks if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game played between the adversary A and a challenger C.
• Initialization. The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to generate the public parameters Parms.
Without loss of generality, we assume that a user and the PV, respectively, perform the KeyGen algorithm to set their private/public key pairs (x, X ) and (y, Y ). The challenger C possesses the public parameters Parms and public keys (X , Y ). Afterward, C then sends (X , Y , Parms) to A.
• Queries. The adversary A may adaptively issues a number of queries as follows: -ProofGen query. The adversary A chooses a challenge message Chal and sends it to the challenger C. The challenger C runs the ProofGen algorithm and responds a valid proof message P D to the adversary A.
• Forgery. The adversary A output a pair (Chal * , P * D ), where Chal * did not appear in the ProofGen query mentioned above. If the response of the VerifyProof algorithm on (Chal * , P * D ) is ''true'', then the adversary A wins the game.
D. HARDNESS PROBLEM
Let G be the multiplicative cyclic group of large prime order p with generator g. Here, we define the discrete logarithm (DL) problem in the group G: given elements g, g a ∈ G for unknown a ∈ Z p , the DL problem in G is to compute a. The associated security assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 5: The DL assumption is defined as follows: given g, g a ∈ G for unknown a ∈ Z * p , there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A with non-negligible probability who can compute a. The successful probability (advantage) of the adversary A is presented as
III. PROPOSED DV-NRPDP SCHEME
Here, we propose a concrete DV-NRPDP scheme. As the framework of DV-NRPDP schemes defined in Section 2.1, the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme consists of eight algorithms as below.
• Setup. A system operator takes a security parameter l as input, and generates public parameters Parms as follows. Let G be a group of large prime order p, which is a multiplicative cyclic group, such as the finite field F p or a multiplicative cyclic group of elliptic curve. Let g be a generator of the group G. In addition, the system operator picks up a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z p , which is viewed as random oracles. Finally, the system operator returns the public parameters Parms = {G, p, g, H }.
• KeyGen. The user, PV and CSS, respectively, select random private keys x, y, z ∈ "ąZ p , and compute the corresponding public keys X = g x mod p, Y = g y mod p and Z = g z mod p.
• TagGen. Assume that a user would like to store the data D to the cloud storage managed by the CSS while designating a private verifier (PV) with the public key Y . Without loss of generality, assume that the data D is divided into n blocks {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }. For each block m i , the user selects a random integer k i ∈ Z p , and computes the associated tag
. Thus, the user obtains = {t 1 = (r 1 , s 1 ), t 2 = (r 2 , s 2 ), . . . , t n = (r n , s n )}, where denotes the tag set of the data D = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }. Finally, the user sends TD = {D, } to the CSS.
• RecGen. Upon receiving TD = {D, } from a user, the CSS generates and returns a receipt R D to the user as follows. By the data D and the user's identity, the CSS sets the data extract information D EI =(data_name, data_size, n, upload_time, user_ID). Afterward, the CSS with the private key z selects a random integer k ∈ Z p , and computes u = • VerifyProof. Upon receiving the proof message P D = { , h v } from the CSS, the verifier with s 2 ) , . . . , t n = (r n , s n )}. The verifier checks VOLUME 5, 2017 whether two equalities H (D EI ||r 1 ||r 2 || · · · ||r n ||s 1 ||s 2 ||
If both equalities hold, the verifier returns ''true'', otherwise ''false"''. Note that the checking result is also sent the user if the verifier is the PV.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Here, we present the security analysis of the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme. The security of the proposed scheme is based on the computing discrete logarithm (DL) assumption defined in Section 2.4. In the random oracle model [26] , [27] , we show that the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme possesses three kinds of existential unforgeabilities, namely, tag-unforgeability, receipt-unforgeability, and proofunforgeability defined in Section 2.3, which are shown in Theorems 1, 2 and 3, respectively.
Theorem 1: In the random oracle model and under the computing DL assumption, the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme offers tag-unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Concretely, assume that a PPT adversary A with a non-negligible advantage can forge a valid tag. Then, we can construct an algorithm C who can solve the DL problem with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that the challenger C receives the random instance (G, p, g, X = g x ) of computing discrete logarithm problem in the group G modulo a large prime p. By interacting with the adversary A, the challenger C will return x in the following game.
• Initialization. The challenger C runs the KeyGen algorithm to obtain the private/public pair (y, Y = g y ) of the PV. The challenger C sets the public parameters Parms = {G, p, g, H } while sending X , Y and Parms to the adversary A. Note that the hash function H behaves as random oracles controlled by C. The challenger C needs to maintain a list L H that is initially empty and is used to keep track of answers to H queries.
• Queries. The challenger C answers the following queries which are issued by the adversary A. 
• Forgery. The adversary A output a tag tuple (m * , t * ) with public keys (X , Y ). Note that m * did not appear in the TagGen query mentioned above. If the tag tuple (m * , t * ) is valid, then the adversary A wins the game. Assume that the adversary A can output a valid tag tuple (m * , t * = (r * , s * )) with a non-negligible probability . By adopting the forking lemma in [28] and [29] , we can replay the adversary A with the same random tape and different hash oracles (h * and h ), the challenger C can obtain two valid tag tuples (m * , t * = (r * , s * )) and (m * , t = (r * , s )) with a non-negligible probability at least /2 such that
where h * and h are two hash values from H hash queries under the random oracle model. Since X = g x and Y = g y , we have
Thus, the challenger C can compute x = s * −s h * −h with a non-negligible probability, which contradicts the computing DL assumption. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: In the random oracle model and under the computing DL assumption, the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme offers receipt-unforgeability against adaptive chosenmessage attacks. Concretely, assume that a PPT adversary A with a non-negligible advantage can forge a valid receipt. Then, we can construct an algorithm C who can solve the DL problem with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that the challenger C receives the random instance (G, p, g, Z = g z ) of computing discrete logarithm problem in the group G modulo a large prime p. By interacting with the adversary A, the challenger C will return z in the following game.
• Initialization. The challenger C sets the public parameters Parms = {G, p, g, H } while sending Parms and the CSS's public key Z to the adversary A. Note that the hash function H behaves as random oracles controlled by C. The challenger C needs to maintain a list L H that is initially empty and is used to keep track of answers to H queries.
• Queries. The challenger C answers the following queries which are issued by the adversary A.
-H hash query. This query is identical to the H hash query described in Theorem 1. 
• Forgery. The adversary A output a receipt R * D with data extract information D * EI and the public key Z , where D * EI did not appear in RecGen query mentioned above. If the receipt R * D is correct and valid in the VerifyRec algorithm, then the adversary A wins the game. Assume that the adversary A can output a valid receipt tuple R * D = {D * EI , (u * , v * )} with a non-negligible probability . By adopting the forking lemma in [28] and [29] , we can replay the adversary A with the same random tape and different hash oracles (h * and h ), the challenger C can obtain two valid receipt tuples {D * EI , (u * , v * )} and {D * EI , (u * , v )} with a non-negligible probability at least /2 such that
where h * and h are two hash values from H hash queries under the random oracle model. Since Z = g z , we have
Thus, the challenger C can compute z = v * −v h * −h with a non-negligible probability, which contradicts the computing DL assumption. Q.E.D.
Theorem 3: In the random oracle model and under the computing DL assumption, the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme offers proof-unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Concretely, assume that a PPT adversary A with a non-negligible advantage can forge a valid proof message. Then, there exists an algorithm C who can solve the DL problem with a non-negligible advantage.
Proof: By Theorem 1, the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme offers tag-unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks. Assume that the associated tag t i = (r i , s i ) for each data block mi stored in the CSS should be valid and not destroyed. In the meantime, we also assume that some data block m j stored in CSS is destroyed due to willful or accidental factors. Upon receiving a challenge message on the data containing the destroyed data block m j , the malicious CSS (or an adversary A) would like to generate the correct proof message to convince the PV that all data blocks are correctly stored in the cloud server.
Without loss of generality, assume that the adversary A (malicious CSS) can forge a valid proof message P D = { , h v }, where s 2 ) , . . . , t n = (r n , s n )} is the tag set of the data D = {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n }. Assume that some data block m j in {m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n } is destroyed. In such a case, the adversary A would like to generate the correct proof message P D = { = {t 1 = (r 1 , s 1 ), t 2 = (r 2 , s 2 ) , . . . , t n = (r n , s n )}, h v } to pass the 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
Here, we compare our proposed DV-NRPDP scheme with Ren et al.'s DV-PDP scheme [22] . For convenience to evaluate the computation costs, we define the following notations.
• T e : The time for modular exponentiation;
• T m : The time for modular multiplication;
• T h : The time for executing the adopted one-way hash function. Note that the time for computing modular addition or subtraction is ignored, because they are much smaller than T e , T m and T h . Without loss of generality, let a file F = m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m n be the set of the message blocks, where n be the number of message blocks. TABLE 1 lists the comparisons between our proposed DV-NRPDP scheme with Ren et al.'s DV-PDP scheme [22] , in terms of the computation costs of generating a tag, generating a proof and verifying a proof, and several security properties. For three computation costs of generating a tag, generating a proof and verifying a proof, our proposed DV-NRPDP scheme, respectively, requires T e + T m + T h , nT h and 3T e + nT m + T h . For the three computation costs, Ren et al.'s DV-PDP scheme requires T e + 2T m + 2T h , 3nT e + nT m + nT h and T e + T m , respectively. For the required computation costs of generating a tag and generating a proof, our scheme is better than Ren et al.'s DV-PDP scheme. On the other hand, our scheme requires more computations than Ren et al.'s scheme for the computation cost of verifying a proof. The point is that our DV-NRPDP scheme offers the non-repudiation receipt of the outsourced data for protecting servers. For the nonrepudiation receipt functionality, the extra computation cost requires only 2T e + 2T m + 2T h .
VI. CONCLUSION
The previous system model of DV-PDP scheme did not offer the non-repudiation receipt for the uploaded data. It would incur the disputation between users and the CSS. Thus, we defined the system model, framework and adversary model of DV-NRPDP schemes to address the non-repudiation issue. The first DV-NRPDP scheme was proposed in the article. In the DV-NRPDP scheme, the CSS generated a signature as the non-repudiation receipt for receiving the uploaded data from the client. Based on the computing discrete logarithm (DL) assumption and in the random oracle model, we formally proved that the proposed DV-NRPDP scheme possesses three kinds of existential unforgeabilities, namely, tag-unforgeability, receipt-unforgeability and proofunforgeability. Finally, we demonstrated the comparisons with the previously proposed schemes to show the advantages of the proposed scheme.
